Harry Miller was born and raised in Chelmsford. He worked as a labourer and fish hawker and joined the army in August 1914. He left England for Gallipoli in July 1915, and following withdrawal in December 1915 went to Egypt and then Lebanon. He died from wounds received at the First Battle of Gaza in March 1917. His mother lived in French’s Square; his sister in Orchard Street.

Harry was born in Chelmsford in 1885, the son of Frederick Miller and Emily Miller. (nee Shuttlewood). Both parents had been born in Chelmsford, his father in 1851, his mother in 1854. Harry was christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 6th March 1886, along with his brother Frederick. At the time the family lived at Bridge Row, Chelmsford (now Upper Bridge Road).

Harry’s parents had married on 25th October 1875 at St. John’s Church, Moulsham. At the time Harry’s father was aged 20, a labourer of Moulsham Street, Chelmsford, the son of Charles Miller, a carter. His mother was aged 19, also of Moulsham Street, Chelmsford, and the daughter of Zacariah Shuttlewood, a glass mender.

Six years later Harry’s mother was living with her parents and own children at 115 Moulsham Street,

Harry’s 15 siblings, all Chelmsford-born, included George Miller (born in 1878 and christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 5th April 1879), Annie Miller (also christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 5th April 1879), Frederick Miller (born in 1880) Emily Miller (christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 2nd August 1884, died the same year), Thomas Miller (born in 1887 and christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 3rd October 1891), Emily Miller (born c1890 and christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 3rd October 1891), Alice Thirza Miller (born in 1892 and christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 5th November 1892), Flora Louisa Miller (christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 3rd August 1895, died the same year), Charles Miller (born in 1894 also christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 3rd August 1895), Hilda May Miller (born in 1897), Florence Miller (born c1899 and christened at St. John’s Church, Moulsham on 11th October 1898),) and Mary Miller (born 1900).

By the time of the 1891 census Harry’s family had moved from Moulsham to Springfield. The census that year recorded Harry living with his parents and four siblings at 3 Navigation Cottages in Springfield. At the time his father was employed as bricklayer’s labourer. Around 1898 they are thought to have returned to Moulsham and were at Black Horse Yard off Moulsham Street in October 1898. Sixteen year-old Harry was recorded in the 1901 census at Union Yard, Chelmsford, accompanied by his parents and seven siblings. He and his father were both general labourers.

A decade later Harry, then 27, single, and working as a self-employed fish hawker, was lodging with his sister and brother-in-law (Annie and Frank Holloway) and their four young children at 2 Irvingite Yard, off Moulsham Street.

Harry’s father died in 1913.

In August 1914 Harry enlisted at Chelmsford into the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment, reaching the rank of Lance Corporal 2222 (renumbered in 1917 as 250382). The battalion was a Territorial unit formed in 1908 with its headquarters in Market Road, Chelmsford, and it consequently contained many Chelmsford men who were to lose their lives in the war. The term ‘territorial’ indicated that the volunteers such as Harry who served with the battalion were under no obligation to serve overseas, with their focus on home defence, but many like him agreed to serve abroad after the declaration of war on 4th August 1914.

At the outbreak of the war Harry’s battalion and the other three Territorial battalions that formed the Essex Brigade were half way through their fortnight’s annual training at Clacton. On 3rd August 1914, the day before war was declared, Harry’s battalion was initially ordered back to Chelmsford, but that was countermanded and the battalion marched for Dovercourt that afternoon. The following day mobilization papers were issued to all ranks and the battalion was alloted part of a pre-arranged defensive line west of Dovercourt.

On 9th August 1914 the battalion was sent to Brentwood. It did not stay there long, moving to north-east Norfolk by the end of the month. In April 1915 it moved to West Bergholt, before transferring to St. Alban’s in Hertfordshire the middle of the following month. By then the battalion, along with three other Essex Territorial battalions, including the 1/4th Battalion of the Essex Regiment, formed the 161st (Essex) Brigade in the 54th (East Anglian) Division. The majority of the period since the outbreak of the war had been spent training in expectation of foreign service.

From St. Alban’s the battalion travelled to Devonport by train, and departed on board the S.S. Grampian on 23rd July 1915, with a somewhat depleted strength of 29 officers and 649 other ranks. Its ultimate destination was to be Gallipoli, Turkey to join the Allied forces participating in the campaign against the Turks which had started on 25th April 1915.

Stops were made at Malta and Alexandria in Egypt, before sailing to Mudros Bay on the small Greek island of Lemnos. From there the battalion, including Harry, sailed towards Gallipoli, transferred to flat-bottomed boats and were put ashore at A Beach, Suvla Bay on 9th August 1915 as reinforcements to troops that had landed there over the previous three days.

The battalion had a difficult time in Gallipoli, making little progress against the Turkish Army. With the failure of the Gallipoli campaign it was withdrawn from Anzac Cove on 4th December 1915; its strength reduced by then to 13 officers and 141 other ranks, of whom six officers and 100 other ranks had served throughout the 17 weeks in Gallipoli. It had left England with 29 officers and 649 other ranks in July 1915.

Following its withdrawal from Gallipoli the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment landed in Alexandria, Egypt on 17th December 1915. On 28th December 1915 it was sent to El Hamam, Egypt where it formed part of the Western Frontier Force. On 5th March 1916 the battalion left for Mena Camp near Cairo, Egypt, before it was moved eastwards to protect the Suez Canal and its vital supply route, in an area known as the Southern Canal Section, from Turkish attacks across the Sinai Peninsula. The battalion remained there until January 1917.

By early 1917 the Turkish forces that had been threatening Egypt were being steadily driven back across the Sinai Peninsular towards Palestine by the advancing Allies. The 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment spent most of February crossing the Peninsular and by late March 1917 was close to the Palestine town of Gaza, then still held by the Turks. The town was of strategic importance and had to be captured by the Allies if they were to succeed in their objective of driving the Turkish army northwards out of Palestine and thus isolating other Turkish forces in Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsular.

The initial attack to capture Gaza, known as the First Battle of Gaza, began early on 26th March 1917. The Allied plan was for the main advance against the town was to be made by 53rd Division, to which was temporarily attached the 161st Brigade, including the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment. It would attack against the southern side of the town. The remainder of the 54th Division was in support south-east of Gaza at Sheikh Abbas to protect any counter-attack. The cavalry of the Desert Column were to circle the town to the north and east to provide further protection and block the Turks’ lines of retreat. Other Allied forces would take up positions in sand dunes to the western, coastal, side of Gaza.

The initial deployments of the Desert Column went well and by late morning Gaza was encircled. Just before noon, somewhat delayed by fog, troops from the 53rd Division advanced towards the town’s key defensive postion, a hill called Ali el Muntar which overlooked Gaza. At 1:30 p.m. the 161st Brigade, including the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment, was called in from Mansura to assist the 53rd Division attack by taking a hill known as Green Hill south-west of Ali el Muntar. A post-war battalion history recalled:

“Whilst the 161st Brigade was concentrating at Mansura, the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] 53rd Division issued orders that the Brigade less one battalion, was to attack and carry the hill, known as Green Hill, just south-west of Ali el Muntar, in the gap between the 158th Brigade on the right and the 160th Brigade on the left. It was thought the effort would prove sufficiently powerful to cause the enemy to abandon Ali el Muntar and thus open the way to Gaza.

Shortly before 4 o’clock the battalion commanders conferred with the Brigadier and the objective was outlined. The Turks were holding on to the centre, but their flanks pushed back by the advance of the brigades of the 53rd Division. The position to be taken lay plain to the view in the distance, the flanks being natural objects standing out clearly on the skyline. The peak of Ali el Muntar was the limit on the right; the sandy hill by the Labyrinth, then known as Brown Hill, on the left. Green Hill lay at a lower altitude in the centre, with a lone tree stump upon it to direct the march of the inner flanks of the two leading battalions.

The knowledge of the Turkish defences was scanty and much was left to the initiative and resource of the officers when the attack had been launched. The numerical strength of the enemy in the assailed position was not known. The Turkish line was later found not to have been continuous, but consisted of fortified sections, well wired, with deep pits excavated in front. It was an ideal position for the defending machine gunner, for he had a mile and a half plain lying straight before him, with little obstruction to view, and he could easily maintain his traverse. Many of the machine gun positions were perfectly constructed, so deep from back to front that only at the shortest range could a bullet reach the guns or teams.

It was the machine gun fire which, in fact, caused most of the casualties to the Brigade, for, as with the attacking infantry, so with the defenders, artillery did not play a prominent part in this phase of the operation. For some unknown reason, artillery support (though asked for) was not given until just prior to the final assault, when (after repeated requests by Brigade headquarters) a few howitzer rounds were directed on Green Hill. Organized artillery support might have enabled Green Hill to be taken half an hour earlier (time was of vital importance with dusk approaching), but it would also have kept down the casualties. The Turkish artillery was silent and the defenders would have been demoralised by well-sustained fire. The taking of the position would consequently have been much less expensive in soldiers’ lives.

The 1/4th and 1/5th Essex were entrusted with the attack, each with a section of the Machine Gun Company. Two companies of the 1/6th Essex were in support, with the remainder of the Machine Gun Company. The other two companies were in brigade reserve and the 1/7th Essex were in divisional reserve.

Brigade headquarters followed the attack for about a thousand yards and then took up a position on the open plain with the last two companies of the 1/6th Essex. The advance was made most methodically and in perfect order, as if upon peace manoeuvres. The 1/4th Essex had two companies in front, with the third and forth companies constituting the second and third lines. The 1/5th had two companies in front and two in rear in similar alignment. They were in line of platoons, which split into line of sections when the enemy machine guns opened about a mile from the objective, and very shortly afterwards to extended order at three paces interval.

At a fast pace, almost a run, the long long line unwaveringly pressed on until, after a pause to gather strength and cohesion for the last effort, and in unison with two companies of the 1/6th Essex, the Turkish trenches in the centre were occupied with a rush at about 5.30 p.m. During the advance the right of the 1/4th Essex passed through details of the 53rd Division.

The Brigade suffered severe casualties, chiefly from close range machine gunfire. Lieut..-Colonel Jameson, commanding the 1/4th, was mortally wounded when about 200 yards from Green Hill. and Lieut.-Colonel Gibbons, commanding the 1/5th, was wounded in the thigh soon after the advance commenced. As the latter lay upon the ground he heard the monotonous tat-tat of the machine gun fore - for it was the Turkish custom to fire through the ammunition belts without check - mingled with bursts from Lewis guns, and then ‘at last I heard a cheer - and another and another - and I knew that victory was won.’”

The 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment suffered very heavily at the First Battle of Gaza - the Commonwealth War Graves Commission lists 117 fatalities for the battalion on 26th March 1917 plus 113 in the 1/4th Battalion of the Essex Regiment. Harry, who was wounded in the attack, succumbed to his injuries the next day (27th March 1917). He was aged 31. The heavy casualties were mainly caused by the steady fire of three Turkish machine guns and one automatic rifle, aided by their protected position and perfect lateral filed for cross fire.

The earlier stages of the attack by the 53rd Division and the advance of the 161st Brigade were witnessed by an Essex officer, then with the remainder of the 54th Division on Sheik Abbas Ridge, who wrote:

“We had an easy time that day, but the hours were full of absorbing interest. The ridge commanded a fine view of the long, flat stretch of country up to the outskirts of Gaza. Over this ground during the afternoon we saw the advance of the 53rd Division, long lines of men moving slowly and steadily forward in the early stages of the action. From our natural amphitheatre they could be followed, with the help of field glasses, up to where the fleecy clouds of the shrapnel bursts were thick enough to show that further advance from this point could only be made by short rushes and the employment of all available cover. We could see nothing of this latter stage and could only conjecture its progress by the frequent rise and fall in the volume of the continuous rifle fire.

The advance went on for several hours - until 4 p.m. - and the fascination of it held our attention; long lines of little figures moving forward at a slow walk. After 5 p.m. the last line had gone over and no further movement could be seen, but the volume of rifle fire increased and diminished much more rapidly. The struggle for the defences was at its height. Shortly after this, one of us, searching the ground thoroughly with powerful glasses, and paying especial attention to a commanding hill near which much firing appeared to centre, was able to observe the final stages of the attack. The light was failing and the troops were too far off to permit anything but a general impression being gained. The men were obviously making splendid use of the cover available. At frequent intervals a small portion of the line would surge forward a short distance and then melt again into invisibility. The last scene, although much more difficult to follow, was even more fascinating than the advance of the 53rd Division. We were seeing the final stages of the assault, watching men who were at close grips with the enemy. We saw the progress of this determined attack until darkness and the receipt of orders to move to fresh positions prevented further observation.

Afterwards when our diaries could be compared with the official report of the battle and its course traced out on a map, we were able to identify the distant figures pushing home a determined attack in the final daylight hours with the Essex [161st] Brigade of our Division. In estimating the character of the work done by the Essex men, it must be remembered that the Division had not much engaged with the enemy for over a year, and although the efficiency of the troops had been carefully fostered and improved during this period, there were considerable numbers of men who had not yet been in action. Any doubts as to the power of these troops to conduct successfully an arduous attack were set at rest for those who had the good fortune to witness its being carried out. It is true that we were a long distance away, but the inevitable loss of detail involved permitted us to gain a clearer perspective of the attack as a whole. An individual in an attacking force is unable to obtain more than a limited impression of the events in his immediate neighbourhood. We, in our distant and detached position were able to follow the assault of the whole Essex [161st] Brigade and it left us with a lasting impression of skill and courage.”

Another officer serving with the 161st Brigade wrote:

“The Battalions did not rest at any time during the attack. When the hostile machine gun fire opened, both the 1/4th and 1/5th Essex quickly broke up from artillery formation into extended order, the forward movement being unchecked during this process. The attack was then pressed home with exceptional celerity and in perfect drillbook fashion, platoons supporting each other as those in the rear closed up. Although the casualties were heavy, it is the general opinion that they must have been heavier still but for the swift and determined advance of the Brigade through what was nothing less than a hurricane of machine gun fire.”

Another onlooker, with the Signal Company, also described the attack:

“Our headquarters were in a gully just below a large flat plain across which the Essex advanced under a terrific machine gun and rifle fire. It was a stirring and splendid sight. They behaved just as if they were taking part in a field day scheme at home and not a man faltered. They started in company columns, which rapidly split up into small groups, which, in turn spread out until they were in long single lines advancing across the plain towards Green Hill, which was their objective. As they neared the hill they fixed bayonets and charged, taking the hill in just under an hour from the commencement of the attack, but, unfortunately, they suffered rather heavily from machine guns....

The enemy had a clean sweep over the plain and the hideous tat-tat seemed almost incessant. Of all the horrible sounds of war, I think the devilish tat-tat of a Maxim is the most fear-inspiring. There is something vicious in its rattle which goes straight to the heart. Rifle fire is altogether different - it has a dull rolling sound - but clear and sharp above it are the spiteful bursts of machine gun fore. Perhaps a gunner could be content with spurts of four or five shots as he searches the enemy, then comes. burr, burr, burr, as a whole belt of ammunition goes through at a target which suddenly presents itself....

Through all this infernal racket the ration and ammunition camels preserved a stoical calm and did not turn a hair. It is really comical to see the air of surprised interest with which they look upon a bursting shell and when they are hit they lie down without a grunt and hand in the their cheeks. Indeed they are said to be able to lie down and die at will if they get too ‘fed up’ with their unenviable life. Still, they did good work in bringing up water, etc., and did not flinch from their steady, serene plodding when the convoy was under fore. Whilst gun teams, signal wagons and ‘backsheesh’ horses were rushing madly about, perhaps dragging a dying horse in the traces, these much maligned but useful animals came steadily on.”

The post-war battalion history continued:

“Although the frontage of the objective, approximately half a mile, stretched from Ali el Muntar to Brown Hill, the line of attack contracted as losses occurred and the machine gun fire smote the troops. The right flank, which was directed upon the white mosque on Ali el Muntar, was protected by Lewis guns whose teams were ordered to deal with Turkish machine guns located behind some cactus just slightly to the right of the mosque. The right flank tended to move towards the centre and this impulse was strengthened by the fact that there was a re-entrant [enemy line] between Ali el Muntar and Green Hill. As a consequence, when the final movement took place the remnants of the 1/4th Essex had swung round somewhat towards the left face of Green Hill and were in close contact with the centre. It was there the Essex Territorials came up against the core of the resistance, and it was there, too, occurred that involuntary move forward, without word of command, which won the position and determined the issue of the day’s fighting.

The advance of the centre companies of the 1/4th and 1/5th Essex was rapid and unhesitating....

When the long lines were close to the Turkish wire they found a shred of cover caused by a slight rise. It was very slight, but it was just sufficient to protect them from fire. Lying in the centre of the attacking line was Harvey Capron, adjutant of the 1/5th Essex, who had played his part with the greatest zest and eagerness. Near by him was Captain Colvin, of C Company, with a sergeant and one or two others. The line thickened as the supports came in and then Capron said to his colleague that the time had come to take the trenches. He made a movement as if to rise, which, apparently, was instantly detected by a Turkish sniper and he was shot through the heart. The sergeant had barely time to call Captain Colvin’s attention to the casualty, when, as if animated by the dead officer’s resolve, the whole line rose and went through the Turkish wire into the trenches. The men of the two companies of the 1/6th Essex, hurrying up to the fray, had just time to reach the firing line when the forward move began, and they gave impetus to the last decisive rush. The Turks, already withdrawing, left hurriedly. A few brave men remained and were bayoneted as they stood, whilst others were shot down as they ran down the communications trenches....

“The left of the 1/5th kept resolutely upon its objective, the Brown Hill, on the skyline. The bulk of D Company, when they entered the trenches, found a series of broken gullies and on the top of the farther rise were the men of the Royal Sussex Regiment, who had been holding on since early morning. They had suffered severe losses from what they thought to be minnenwerfer fire, but Major WIlson was inclined to think that 5.9 H.E. was responsible. The enemy put down a barrage from these guns just as the objective was reached by the 1/5th Essex on Brown Hill, but fortunately the range was just too long to do much injury, though it caused casualties among the last men in. From that point patrols were sent out to ascertain the enemy’s whereabouts and touch was sought with the companies on the right.

In the centre of the objective of the 1/5th Essex was a small stone hut and this proved a great attraction, for it was the focus of enemy resistance. Three platoons of B and D Companies concentrated there, suffering considerable casualties in so doing, for at least one machine gun, resolutely handled, operated therefrom. They got within fifty yards of the structure, when further progress was stayed.”

Captain J. F Finn, then commanding No. 5 Platoon of B Company, recalled:

“I straightened out the line, but many more men were hit as the bullets continued to fall about us like hail. [F. P.] Windsor (2nd Lieut.) called out to me that he was hit, so did [A. E.] Gilmore (2nd Lieut.), who was some way off. Not only did he give this information, but he shouted out the details; this despite the fact that he dared not move for fear of being hit again and that the engagement was continuing vigorously. A few minutes later Womersley, (signalling officer), who was near me on the left, got up and said that he was going to try and get in telephonic communication with the gunners to see if they could put fire on to the stone hut. This was very desirable, as in this part of the line we had no artillery support during the operation. Womersley, I heard afterwards, only got a little way before being hit twice. Those of us who were not wounded kept up the brisk fire in an endeavour to get shots in the windows of the hut, but we were not in a position to do much. I sent a man back to battalion headquarters to report, but discovered afterwards that, owing to casualties, it did not exist. A little while later we heard a loud cheer from the right. This it was afterwards discovered came from A and C Companies of the 1/5th, the remnants of the 1/4th and the three companies of the 1/6th, when they attacked the works with the bayonet and captured the Green Hill defences. Following this, the Turkish fire ceased and doubtless those on our immediate front retired owing to the fall of Green Hill.

Darkness fell and we commenced to dig in....Our work in entrenching continued.... It was done to a most heart-rending accompaniment of groans and cries from the wounded, who were lying, it seemed, everywhere. No one could be spared to take these poor fellows back and no stretchers were there even if this could have been possible. The R.A.M.C. arrangements were inadequate for a sudden advance over practically two miles of open country.”

Major Wilson, by then in command of the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment recalled:

“It was pretty evident that we had the Turks beat; standing on the Brown Hill we could plainly hear the rumble of wheels and hubbub of excitement rising from the town [Gaza]. The Turks were undoubtedly withdrawing with all speed they could and our patrols encountered no opposition, although they penetrated almost to the town itself.”

Despite this success, albeit at a heavy price, and that of other Allied force around the town, Gaza was not taken by the Allies. On the basis of incomplete and misleading information senior commanders had already taken the decision to abandon the attack which they believed could not taken by nightfall. Consequently Allied troops were withdrawn just at the point when the Turks were on the point of collapse. Further attempts to capture Gaza on 27th March 1917, which by then was reinforced by the Turks, failed. Gaza would not fall to the Allies until 7th November 1917 at the Third Battle of Gaza.

On 26th March 1917 the First Battle of Gaza claimed the lives of nine Chelmsford men from the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment: Harold Edgar Darby, Frederick Frank Eve, Thomas William King, William Leslie Millar, Arthur Peacock, Augustus Bertie Salmon, Albert Edward Smith, Stanley Percy Spurgeon, and Ernest Walter Staines. A tenth, with the 1/4th Battalion of the Essex Regiment was also killed; George Henry Alfred Humphreys.

A comrade from the 1/4th Battalion of the Essex Regiment, William Henry Gurton, died from wounds on 28th March 1917.

Other Chelmsford men from the 1/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment wounded at Gaza who were to die later in the war included: Percy Andersen, and Ernest Horrex while Edward Charles Cook was to die as a prisoner in Turkish hands on 4th April 1917.

Today Harry lies at Gaza War Cemetery in Israel (grave: II. E. 2)

The Essex County Chronicle of 20th April 1917 reported:

“Mrs. Holloway, 41 Orchard Street, Chelmsford, has received notice from the War Office that her brother, Pt. Harry Miller, Essex Regt., died on March 27 from wounds.”

A similar report appeared in the same day’s Essex Weekly News:

“Mrs. Holloway, Orchard-street, Moulsham, Chelmsford, has received an intimation of the death from wounds of her brother, Pte. H. Miller, Essex Regt.”

Harry is commemorated on the Civic Centre Memorial, Chelmsford, and the Moulsham Parish Memorial, St. John’s Church, Moulsham. Harry was entitled to the 1914-15 Star, British War Medal, and Victory Medals which were posthumously posted to his sister Anne at 41 Orchard Street .

The 1918 register of electors listed Harry’s widowed mother and an absent Charles Miller at 12 French’s Square, Chelmsford.

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